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Studies have shown that small-scale agricultural producers from developing countries do not 
generally obtain the potential gains of trade. To investigate what can be done to help them get 
better prices, we examine ways to increase their bargaining power. Using data from 1,854 
cocoa transactions between traders and producers in Cameroon during the 2005/2006 season, 
we show that when the bargaining situation is least favorable to the producers (because prices 
are non-negotiable due to interlinked credit and there is information asymmetry) the traders 
seize the entire surplus generated by the trade. Farmers who can avoid accepting credit from 
the cocoa buyers and can delay sales until after the start of the school year, when the buyers 
will not be able to take advantage of the farmers’ financial need, are able to negotiate higher 
prices. To improve their bargaining situation, Cameroonian cocoa producers need an efficient 
market information system, better access to credit and the development of collective 
marketing. 
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Des études ont montré qu’en général les petits producteurs des pays en voie de 
développement n’obtiennent pas les éventuels profits du marché. Afin de réfléchir à ce qui 
pourrait les aider à obtenir de meilleurs prix, nous étudions les moyens d’augmenter leur 
pouvoir de négociation. A partir de données concernant 1,854 transactions ayant trait au 
cacao, entre les négociants et les producteurs du Cameroun pendant la saison 2005/2006, 
nous démontrons que lorsque la situation de négociation est la moins avantageuse pour les 
producteurs (parce que les prix ne sont pas négociables en raison des crédits conjugués et de 
l’asymétrie de l’information) les négociants raflent la totalité du surplus que génèrent les 
transactions. Les fermiers qui peuvent se passer des crédits que proposent les acheteurs de 
cacao et qui sont capables de retarder les ventes jusqu’après le début de l’année scolaire – 
lorsque les acheteurs ne sont pas en mesure de profiter des difficultés financières que 
connaîtraient les fermiers – peuvent négocier des prix plus élevés. Pour améliorer la situation 
dans laquelle ils se trouvent lorsqu’ils négocient, les producteurs de cacao camerounais ont 
besoin d’un système d’information efficace sur les marchés, d’un meilleur accès au crédit et 
d'un développement du marketing collectif. 
Mots-clés : prix de réserve ; information asymétrique ; théorie de la négociation ; cacao ; 
Cameroun 
 
I. Introduction 
Many empirical studies have been conducted in developing countries to explain the prices 
received by agricultural producers. The first studies (in the years following agricultural 
liberalization in developing countries) generally concluded that the benefits to smallholder 
producers were limited by high transaction costs, the lack of transport, and difficulties in 
accessing credit (De Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992). Recent studies also show that 
producers remain poorly connected to the market and the traders generally seize the gains 
from trade (Key et al., 2000; Gabre-Madhin, 2001, 2009). After the cocoa markets in Nigeria 
and Cameroon were liberalized, traders and exporters began to supply inputs previously 
supplied by state marketing boards. To overcome credit constraints, these traders devised 
interlinked credit arrangements where inputs were provided by the trader, with the cocoa 
producer obligated to sell his output to the trader and to accept lower prices (Gockowski, 
2008).  
Two ways of enabling farmers to obtain better prices for their products can be explored. The 
first involves promoting collective marketing by producer organizations (POs). Collecting and 
bulking small producers’ outputs at the village level reduces transaction costs (because of 
economies of scale) and also increases their bargaining power. In the wake of liberalization, 
collective marketing by POs gave cause for great hope (De Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992). 
Various studies confirm that producers genuinely obtain a higher price when they sell their 
produce via a PO and this remains an attractive solution today, although its limitations have 
also become clear (Coulter et al., 1999; Bernard et al., 2008). POs sometimes have difficulty 
getting established and, if they do, they also face problems in organizing themselves to market 
their members’ products. POs sometimes operate very effectively, and obtain relatively high 
prices though acquiring only a relatively small share of the quantities produced by their 
members (Bernard et al., 2008). 
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The second way to increase producers’ prices is to strengthen the individual producers’ 
bargaining power. Bargaining theory explains how the surplus generated by trade is divided 
between the buyer and the seller (Stahl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982; Binmore, 1987; Wilson, 
1987; Corominas-Bosch, 2004). It analyzes the main determinants of the distribution of the 
surplus (such as information available to the different agents and the price-setting rules) and 
thereby allows us to identify the variables that can be influenced so as to alter the distribution 
in favor of the producers. This theory has given rise to numerous tests in experimental 
economics. However, it has scarcely, if ever, been used in empirical studies aimed at 
explaining agricultural prices in developing countries. This is regrettable, as improving or 
strengthening the bargaining power of small-scale producers is one way to improve farmers’ 
income and reduce poverty. This article examines the second option (reserving an analysis of 
the impact of collective marketing on prices received by producers for a separate paper).2  
We first analyze the determinants of the producer prices for the case of cocoa farmers in 
Cameroon. Cocoa plays an important economic and social role in Cameroon, accounting for 
6% of export earnings in 2006 and contributing 115 billion CFA francs to the national 
economy. There are approximately 260,000 producers and a total of 400,000 hectares is 
planted to cocoa. Before the 1994 liberalization, the domestic cocoa market was strictly 
regulated. The state supplied the inputs, set a pan-territorial cocoa price, collected the goods 
from the producers (via state-sponsored ‘cooperatives’ in the Southwest region and regulated 
licensed buyers in the Central and South regions) and controlled export marketing by 
cooperatives and licensed buyers. The complete liberalization of cocoa marketing in 1995 
increased the price received by the producer and also the variability of this price (Gilbert et 
al., 1999), but the quality of Cameroonian cocoa declined. Generally speaking, as a result of 
market imperfections, the results of the liberalization policy have not been as good as 
expected (Bernard, 2003; Okah-Atenga, 2005). Consequently, producers often find 
themselves in a weak bargaining situation vis-à-vis buyers (Gockowski, 2008) particularly 
when producers are bound to a buyer or when they sell their goods outside the main 
harvesting period (September to December), as there are fewer buyers during this period. The 
risk of the cocoa beans being damaged if not stored in appropriate conditions (protected 
against humidity and insects) is also a major problem for producers (and even for POs). 
This study was based on data from 1,854 selling transactions by 689 producers in the two 
main production zones of the country, the Centre and the Southwest. These data are taken 
from a survey conducted in 2006 by International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). We 
first review the bargaining theory literature, then formulate and test hypotheses about the 
determinants of the prices received by cocoa producers in Cameroon, after which we discuss 
the implications of these results for development policies.  
 
2. Theoretical framework: Bargaining theory 
Bargaining theory attempts to explain price setting. For a transaction to be conducted, the 
buyer and seller must both derive a certain level of satisfaction. The price is therefore 
necessarily a compromise between the seller’s reserve price (the price below which there is no 
incentive to conduct the transaction) and the buyer’s (the price above which there is no 
incentive to conduct the transaction). Bargaining theory aims to explain where the price will 
                                                 
2 C Kamdem, Impact of collective marketing by cocoa farmers’ organizations in Cameroon, unpublished draft. 
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be set within the bargaining price range defined by the two reserve prices. Theoretical 
analyses of bargaining usually take the reserve prices as exogenous and consider them to be 
equal for all sellers and all buyers. However, in practice price differences between producers 
may result from differences in the bargaining situation or from differences in the producer’s 
or buyer’s reserve prices. Any empirical analysis must therefore incorporate data on both the 
bargaining situation and the reserve prices. 
Three categories of variable determine where the price will be set within the bargaining range: 
 The characteristics of the agents, particularly their level of risk aversion and their 
level of impatience. Risk aversion is a psychological element which determines how 
risk affects the agent’s welfare (and thus behavior). The level of impatience reflects 
the way the agent’s utility declines as the negotiation becomes prolonged. This is 
because of both the opportunity cost of time and the disutility which might result from 
delay in receiving either the money (for the seller) or the product (for the buyer).  
 The market institutions which determine price-setting rules, in particular the identity 
of the party who makes the first price proposal (buyer or seller) and the possibility of 
bargaining (the ‘take it or leave it’ price or a negotiable price).  
 The distribution of information between the buyer and the seller – their respective 
reserve price, risk aversion, level of impatience and level of information. Four 
situations are theoretically possible: i) complete information, ii) asymmetric 
information where only the buyer is completely informed, iii) asymmetric information 
where only the seller is completely informed, and iv) asymmetric (incomplete) 
information on both sides. 
Different combinations of these three categories of variable produce a variety of bargaining 
situations, most of which have been studied in the literature. It is therefore possible to classify 
the literature according to the bargaining situations studied. Table 1 classifies and summarizes 
such literature by combining the price setting rules (the ‘take it or leave it’ price or a 
negotiable price) with the information available to the two agents. In addition to the situations 
presented in this table (differentiated by information and price setting rules), the outcome of 
the bargaining process of course also depends on the characteristics of the agents, particularly 
their risk aversion and level of impatience. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the literature by bargaining situation  
 Price setting rules 
Distribution of information Take it or leave it Negotiable 
Complete information 
 
Trivial case  
 
Stahl (1972), Rubinstein 
(1982), Binmore (1987), 
Wilson (1987), Corominas-
Bosch (2004) 
Asymmetric information 
(party informed = the party 
who makes the first proposal) 
Trivial case  
 
Cramton (1984), Fudenberg 
et al. (1985), Grossman & 
Perry (1985), Gul & 
Sonnenschein (1985), Wilson 
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(1987), Corominas-Bosch 
(2004) 
Asymmetric information 
(party informed = the party 
who does not make the first 
proposal) 
Classic case of decision-
making in a situation of 
uncertainty 
  
Coase (1972), Sobel & 
Takahashi (1983), Cramton 
(1984), Bikhchandami 
(1985), Fudenberg et al. 
(1985), Rubinstein (1985), 
Gul et al. (1986), Wilson 
(1987), Corominas-Bosch 
(2004) 
Incomplete information on 
both sides 
Classic case of decision-
making in a situation of 
uncertainty 
 
Cramton (1984), Fudenberg 
et al. (1985), Wilson (1987), 
Dajun & Katia (1997), 
Watson (1998), Corominas-
Bosch (2004).  
 
For convenience we call the agent who makes the first price proposal the price-maker, and the 
agent who does not make the first price proposal the non-price-maker. In a situation of 
complete information, if the price is non-negotiable, the result is trivial: the price-maker, (i.e. 
the agent who makes the first price proposal) sets the price at the level of the other agent’s 
reserve price and takes the entire surplus. When the price is negotiable, the solution is a little 
more complex. The agents can draw out the negotiations, hence the importance of the level of 
impatience of both the buyer and the seller. Rubinstein (1982) analyzes the case where both 
agents have the same level of impatience. In this situation, the utility of an agent (i) depends 
on both the share of the potential surplus that he obtains (x) and the period during which he 
obtains it (t) using the formula Ui (x, t) = x δt-1, where δt-1 lies between 0 and 1 and represents 
the update coefficient. Rubinstein shows that the price-maker obtains 1/(1- δ) while the non-
price-maker obtains δ/(1- δ). If δ = 0, both agents are extremely impatient and any surplus 
disappears at the second period. The situation is therefore comparable to that of the ‘take it or 
leave it’ price: any surplus is seized by the price-maker. When δ tends to 1 (agents are 
infinitely patient), the surplus tends to be equally distributed. This model (in which the only 
variable distinguishing between the two agents is the right to make the first proposal) shows 
that the market power resulting from this right is correlated to the common impatience of the 
agents. Naturally, one agent may be more patient than the other, which gives him an 
advantage.  
In a situation of incomplete information, an agent who is poorly or insufficiently informed 
risks making the wrong decision. The intensity of this risk falls as his level of information 
increases. The effect of this risk on the behavior of the agent depends on his level of risk 
aversion. If the information is asymmetric, the informed agent enjoys a significant advantage. 
If the informed agent is also the price-maker, the effects support each other, enabling him to 
seize the majority of the surplus. Even if the price is negotiable, the non-price-maker (for 
instance the producer) will find it difficult to play for time, even if he is patient. Indeed, if he 
does not know the reserve price or the level of impatience of the other agent, he runs the risk 
of being too greedy and thus causing the negotiations to break down. He will therefore be 
encouraged not to bargain too aggressively (especially if he is risk averse). The situation in 
which the informed agent is the price-maker is more subtle and more complex. In a situation 
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where prices are non-negotiable, the result depends primarily on the risk aversion of the price-
maker: the greater his aversion to risk, the higher the price he will propose so as to minimize 
the risk of the negotiations breaking down. In a situation where prices are negotiable, a 
Coasian result applies. Coase (1972) demonstrated that if the informed agent is patient and the 
uninformed agent is impatient, the former can seize the majority of the surplus even if it is the 
latter who is the price-maker.  
In a situation of incomplete information for both parties, both agents are subject to risk. In a 
situation where the price is non-negotiable, making the first price proposal remains an 
advantage: the price-maker will generally obtain a larger share of the surplus unless he is 
hugely risk averse. In the situation where prices are negotiable, it is generally the more patient 
agent who will succeed in obtaining the majority of the surplus, even if the different levels of 
risk aversion would suggest otherwise (Cramton, 1984; Watson, 1998).  
Table 2 summarizes the main findings from the literature about each bargaining situation. 
 
Table 2: Main ways of allocating surplus in different bargaining situations 
 Price setting rules 
Distribution of the 
information 
Take it or leave it Negotiable 
Complete information 
 
The price-maker takes the 
entire surplus. The price is 
equal to the reserve price of 
the other agent. 
The possibility of ‘playing for 
time’ enables the non-price-
maker to obtain a share of the 
surplus, especially if both 
agents are patient 
(Rubinstein, 1982), and 
especially if he is more 
patient than the price-maker. 
Asymmetric information 
(party informed = the party 
who makes the first 
proposal) 
The price-maker takes the 
entire surplus. The price is 
equal to the reserve price of 
the other agent. 
The non-price-maker’s 
chance of obtaining a share of 
the surplus, by playing for 
time, is reduced because he 
does not know the other 
agent’s parameters (reserve 
price, rate of impatience), and 
especially if he is risk-averse. 
Asymmetric information 
(party informed = the price-
maker) 
The price-maker will generally 
obtain a larger share of the 
surplus. The allocation 
depends on the level of 
information and risk aversion 
of the price-maker.  
The allocation of the surplus 
depends primarily on how 
impatient the agent is. If the 
informed agent is patient and 
the uninformed agent is 
impatient, the former can 
obtain most of the surplus, 
even if it is the latter who is 
the price-maker (Coase, 
1972).  
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Incomplete information on 
both sides 
The price-maker will generally 
obtain a larger share of the 
surplus. The allocation 
depends on the level of 
information and risk aversion 
of the price-maker.  
The more patient agent will 
generally succeed in 
obtaining the majority of the 
surplus, even if the difference 
in risk aversion would 
suggest otherwise (Cramton, 
1984; Watson, 1998). 
 
 
3. Hypotheses about the determinants of the prices received by cocoa producers in 
Cameroon 
The theoretical explanation of the determinants of the price received by the producer leads us 
to formulate a number of hypotheses about the cocoa market in Cameroon.  
We have seen that the price level depends on the bargaining situation, which may itself be 
characterized in part by combining the price setting rules (‘take it or leave it price’ versus 
negotiable price) with the information available to the two agents. The first stage therefore 
involves characterizing the main bargaining situations in which Cameroonian cocoa producers 
find themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Organization of the cocoa marketing chain in Cameroon 
 
The structure of the cocoa marketing chain is relatively simple (Figure 1), though the two 
main production zones (Centre and Southwest) function differently in some respects. The 
producers can either sell directly to approved buyers (but this often requires a long journey as 
the buyers are based in the towns), sell to coxeurs3 (who generally buy the cocoa from the 
                                                 
3 Coxeurs are collectors working for an approved buyer. They are paid on commission. 
PO 
(in the Centre region)  
Coxeurs  
Approved buyers (also called Licensed Buying) 
Exporters 
Producers 
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producers and resell it to the approved buyers) or entrust the sale of their cocoa to a PO which 
then sells it to the approved buyers. The first marketing channel (selling directly to the 
approved buyers) is primarily the domain of large-scale producers.4 It is not widespread in the 
Centre region (only 5% of the number and volume of transactions), but very widespread in the 
Southwest (53% of transactions and 59% of the volume traded). The second channel (selling 
to coxeurs) is used by about half of the trade, both in the Centre (51% of transactions and 
47% of the volume traded) and the Southwest (47% of transactions and 41% of the volume 
traded). The third channel (selling via a PO) is used only in the Centre, where it accounts for 
almost half of the trade (44% of transactions and 48% of the volume traded).5 As we have 
already explained, there are no POs in the other production region, i.e. the Southwest. The 
approved buyers then resell the cocoa to exporters. This marketing chain is ‘funnel-shaped’: 
with 160,000 producers across the two zones, there are about 1,000 coxeurs who sell the 
produce to approximately 35 approved buyers. At the end of the chain, three exporters control 
almost all the cocoa produced.6 The cocoa is moved from the farms to the villages (where the 
coxeurs and the POs collect the cocoa), before being transported to small provincial towns 
(home to the approved buyers), then finally to the port of Douala (where the exporters are 
based).  
The bargaining situation faced by producers depends on the marketing channel concerned. In 
this article we consider only producers who sell individually. When producers sell 
individually, the first price proposal is always made by the cocoa buyer (coxeur or approved 
buyer). This price can be negotiable or non-negotiable, depending on the relationship between 
the farmer and the buyer. Some farmers receive credit from the cocoa buyer in cash or in 
inputs (insecticides and fungicides). This credit is provided interest-free, simply as a way for 
the buyers to increase their supplies (as the credit is reimbursed in cocoa). In such a situation 
of interlinked transactions, the farmer is bound to a buyer: he cannot capitalize on competition 
between buyers (Gockowski et al., 2008). Furthermore, he can no longer negotiate the price 
with ‘his’ buyer.7 The return on funds lent was estimated to range from 19 to 45% and was 
usually recovered by paying lower prices for the cocoa sold by the producer and/or charging 
higher prices for the inputs supplied on credit (Gockowski et al., 2008). The producers are 
always poorly informed about the situation of the buyers. The buyers are also in a situation of 
uncertainty with regard to the producers’ situation (reserve price and level of impatience), 
except at the start of the school year when almost all cocoa producers need money relatively 
quickly. In Cameroon, in spite of government efforts to reduce the cost of education 
supported by the parents, the cost of educating a child in the rural areas is about 25,000 CFA 
francs per year (INS, 2002), including school needs and the Parent-Teacher Association fee, 
which has become quasi-compulsory. Thus with an average income of 400,000 CFA francs 
per year (Kamdem, 2010) and an average of three children in school (STCP, 2010), education 
                                                 
4 This is convergent with the result obtained by Fafchamps & Vargas (2004) where only producers with large 
quantities travel to sell their product.  
5 After liberalization, in the Centre region the former state cooperatives disappeared. POs primarily grew up 
thanks to the support of development projects such as the Sustainable Tree Crop Program based at the IITA. 
According to Folefack & Gockowski (2004), 40% of the cocoa producers in the Centre are members of a PO. In 
the Southwest, the former cooperatives (such as the Southwest Farmer Cooperative Union based in Kumba) were 
placed in the hands of traders (who are also often producers), although they sometimes present themselves as 
POs. In the absence of projects supporting producers’ initiatives, no POs have been able to emerge in the 
Southwest.  
6 These exporters are Cargill, ADM and OLAMCAM. 
7On the other hand the farmers who have not obtained credit from the cocoa buyers can bargain, and often do. 
Indeed, the negotiation can last more than a day: the coxeur may visit the producer in the morning and again in 
the evening or even the following day. 
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represents approximately 20% of the income of a rural Cameroonian cocoa farmer. Thus, at 
the beginning of the school year farmers have an enormous need for cash, and the buyers are 
fully aware of this. 
In the case of individual sales, the bargaining situation can be defined according to two 
variables: the existence of credit granted by the buyer to the producer (which indicates 
whether or not the price is negotiable) and the selling period (the start of the school year acts 
as a proxy for asymmetric information between buyer and producer). This leads us to identify 
the bargaining situations for cocoa producers in Cameroon shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Bargaining situations of cocoa producers in Cameroon (individual sales) 
Price setting rules 
 
Distribution of the 
information 
Take it or leave it Negotiable 
Asymmetric information 
(informed party = the buyer)  
S0. Individual sales with buyer 
credit at the start of the school 
year 
S1. Individual sales at the 
start of the school year 
(without buyer credit)  
Incomplete information on 
both sides 
S2. Individual sales with buyer 
credit at times other than the 
start of the school year 
S3. Individual sales at times 
other than the start of the 
school year (without buyer 
credit) 
 
According to the different bargaining situations, the price is set at a different level within the 
interval between the two reserve prices. In situation S0, the price will theoretically be set at 
the level of the producer’s reserve price (the buyer seizes the entire surplus). The share of 
surplus obtained by the producer (i.e. the weight of the buyer’s reserve price in the price-
setting process) increases as we shift towards S1 or S2 and the largest share is obtained in 
situation S3. Hence, if it is not the start of the school year (situations S2 and S3), the buyer is 
poorly informed about the producer’s reserve price and level of impatience, a situation which 
may lead the buyer to pay a higher price. This enables us to formulate the following 
hypotheses about the determinants of the prices received by the producers: 
H1: In situation S0 (producers are bound to the buyer by credit and the start of the 
school year), only the producer’s reserve price influences the price (the buyer’s 
reserve price has no effect on the price).  
H2: The price received by the producers is higher in bargaining situations S1 and S2 
than in situation S0. It is even higher in situation S3.  
As the price received by the producer depends on both the bargaining situation and the 
producer’s and the buyer’s reserve prices (PRP and BRP), we need information about the 
reserve prices in order to test our hypotheses. This is difficult in empirical studies as the 
reserve prices involve not only the real costs to which the agents are subjected but also 
opportunity costs. We must therefore look for some proxies for the reserve prices.  
The producer’s reserve price (PRP) represents the threshold price below which it is preferable 
for the producer not to make the transaction. The PRP therefore depends on i) the costs paid 
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by the producer (if the price is lower than the average cost, the producer loses money), ii) the 
price he hopes to obtain from other agents, and iii) the consequences with which he will be 
confronted if he does not succeed in selling his product quickly to another agent.  
The costs borne by the producers include production costs,8 transport costs and transaction 
costs. Production costs are generally lower in the Southwest than in the Centre. Indeed, the 
Southwest is much more favorable to cocoa production from an agro-climatic point of view. 
Moreover, the farms in the Southwest are larger (on average three times larger) and 
production is more intensive (with an average yield of 900–1,000 kg/ha compared to 300–
450 kg/ha in the Centre) (Gilbert et al., 1999).9 The transport costs of cocoa can be estimated 
by the distance between the producer’s home and the point of sale (even if they are also 
affected by other parameters such as the condition of the roads and the means of transport 
available to the producer). This distance also gives us an idea of the transaction costs borne by 
the producers (costs involved in travelling to the point of sale, including the opportunity cost 
of time).10 Transaction costs may also include the losses resulting from manipulative tactics 
used by the buyers in evaluating the level of humidity of the cocoa.11 Finally, because of 
economies of scale, transaction costs also depend on the quantities sold.  
The price that the producer hopes to obtain from other agents depends on the information 
available to him about international prices and the extent to which he can capitalize on the 
competition between buyers. In the cocoa market in Cameroon, not all producers have the 
same level of information about prices. Depending on what is available to him, the producer 
can obtain information via the Market Information System12 introduced by the ONCC 
(National Coffee and Cocoa Board), which requires the availability of a mobile phone. The 
producer can also obtain information from the media (radio, TV and press), from the POs, his 
neighbors or even the buyer. The level of competition depends on the binding practices 
between the producers and the buyers and on the number of buyers present in the zone. The 
producer can be bound to a buyer if the buyer grants him credit in the form of cash or inputs 
(‘interlinked transactions’). Gockowski’s (2008) study on the impact of credit on cocoa 
marketing in Cameroon shows that producers who receive credit from the buyer obtain prices 
lower than those received by other producers. If the producer is not bound by credit, the 
possibility of capitalizing on competition depends primarily on the number of buyers in the 
zone. 
                                                 
8 Since the cocoa farmer price is also guided by the international cocoa market, when the international price is 
too low, the cocoa farmer’s price could be below his production cost, in which case the reserve price depends 
only on the transaction costs. 
9 Although the Southwest is a smaller area than the Centre and has three times fewer producers, it nevertheless 
produces more cocoa. 
10 The point of sale depends to a large extent on the marketing channel adopted: the producer’s house (if selling 
to a coxeur), the cocoa purchasing centres located in the local administrative capitals (if selling to an approved 
buyer), or the PO store.  
11 The buyer measures the level of humidity as this gives an idea of the weight lost by the cocoa during the 
drying process. According to official standards, the normal level of humidity is 8%. For every additional one 
percent in the level of humidity, the buyer deducts one kg of cocoa per 75-kg sack: this is the discount. Only the 
approved buyers have hygrometers: the coxeurs estimate the level of humidity in a more subjective manner by 
breaking open the beans. 
12 This information system involves sending the SMS ‘cocoa’ using a local mobile phone and receiving the CIF 
(cost, insurance and freight) and FOB (free on board) prices in effect on that particular day. This price is 
communicated via an ONCC server. However, this system is not well known among producers.  
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The consequences of the producer’s failure to sell his produce quickly depend primarily on 
the his financial needs. These in turn depend on the level and degree of his income 
diversification and sometimes also on the occurrence of seasonal expenditure for agricultural 
activities or family consumption (such as the start of the school year). 
As regards the buyer, his reserve price (BRP) represents the price below which it is preferable 
for the buyer not to make the transaction. The BRP therefore depends on i) the buyer’s resale 
price, ii) the transport and transaction costs borne by the buyer, iii) the price and quantities 
that he hopes to obtain with other agents (a price which in turn depends on the seasonality and 
number of buyers present in the zone), and iv) the potential damage to his reputation if he 
does not succeed in satisfying his clients’ demands.  
The buyer’s resale price depends on the international price converted into CFA francs and the 
number of intermediaries separating him from the exporter, as approved buyers are closer 
than the coxeurs to the exporters.13 The transport costs are linked to the distance between the 
place of purchase and the place of delivery of the cocoa (the port of Douala), as well as the 
condition of the roads.  
The transaction costs borne by the buyers depend primarily on the volumes sold by the 
producers (economies of scale), the formal and informal taxes to which they are liable and the 
costs of the services required in order to store the producers’ supply. Consequently, in the 
Centre region in particular, the coxeurs are sometimes the target of ‘rackets’ by the authorities 
(in principle, only approved buyers are authorized to buy cocoa). In the Southwest, the 
coxeurs sometimes come together as a CIG (Common Initiative Group), and this is liable to 
formal taxes.14 The cost of credit agreed in order to reserve the supply, such as credit granted 
to farmers during production to guarantee the purchasing contract, must also be taken into 
account. For the coxeurs, we must also take into account the costs of the services they provide 
to the producers during the cocoa marketing campaigns or at other times. For example, they 
act as intermediaries for the purchase of inputs, food products from town (rice, soap, smoked 
fish, etc.) and sometimes building materials. 
The price and quantity that a buyer hopes to obtain from other producers depends primarily 
on the number of rival buyers present in the zone, the possible presence of POs in the zone 
and the seasonal nature of production (during the main harvest period, the buyers are willing 
to pay more as the cocoa is of a better quality and the competition is intensified by the 
presence of numerous buyers).  
 
4. Data 
The data used to test our hypotheses were obtained from a study done by the IITA in 2006. 
This study examined two regions (the Centre and the Southwest), which account for the vast 
majority (85%) of cocoa production in Cameroon. The data were collected using a single 
                                                 
13 The resale price is generally known to the buyers when they negotiate with the producers. The buyers benefit 
from weekly, monthly or quarterly forward contracts agreed with their customers. 
14 Normally, CIGs do not have to pay taxes in Cameroon when they sell their members’ products. But the CIGs 
in the Southwest function differently: they are Buyers’ CIGs which have few registered members and are 
managed only by the leaders, who buy cocoa from the farmers at a lower price, and sell to the LBA (Licensed 
Buying Agency) without sharing the benefits with other members. This is why they pay taxes. 
AfJARE  Vol  6  No 1 December  2010                            Cyrille Bergaly Kamdem, Franck Galtier, James Gockowski,  
                                                                                            Hélène  David-Benz, Johny Egg and Bernadette Kamgnia Dia   
 
 
329 
 
questionnaire taken from the baseline survey of the STCP (Sustainable Tree Crop Program) 
project. The survey recorded the sociological, economic and agronomic characteristics of 
perennial crop producers. We incorporated a new section into the questionnaire to deal with 
cocoa marketing. The surveys were conducted during the period February–April 2006. We 
joined the teams in the field and supervised the implementation of the surveys directly. As a 
census of the cocoa producers was not available, we adopted the following sampling method. 
We visited almost all the villages in the 12 Divisions of the Centre (8) and Southwest (4) 
regions. The district chiefs, the local delegates and some PO directors helped us to meet the 
cocoa producers.  
In total, we interviewed 689 cocoa producers and obtained detailed information about 1,854 
transactions. Of the 689 producers interviewed, most were men (92%). More than 40% of the 
producers interviewed were over the age of 50, indicating an aging population of cocoa 
producers (a fact which has some consequences for the level of production and the dynamics 
of the marketing strategies). Furthermore, more than 60% of the producers have a level of 
education below secondary school (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Socioeconomic characteristics of the producers interviewed (n=689) 
Sex of the producer Level of education Age 
Female 8 %  0–20 3%
Male 92 % No schooling  7% 21–35 20%
  Primary 53% 36–50 33%
  Secondary 36% 51–65 30%
  Higher 4% >65 14%
Source: IITA Survey (2006) 
 
Table 5 shows the distribution of the 1,854 transactions according to the bargaining situation 
and the regions. As the table shows, most transactions in our database concern the Centre 
region. This distribution is in keeping with the number of producers and the production areas 
(which are higher and larger in the Centre) but not the volumes (which are larger in the 
Southwest).  
 
Table 5: Distribution of transactions, median prices and mean prices per type, 
bargaining situation and province 
Type of 
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Southwest Region 
 
Centre Region 
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In
di
vi
du
al
 sa
le
s 
 
S0 (individual 
sales at the start 
of the school 
year with buyer 
credit) 
294 500 521 82 525 529 376 500 523
S1 (individual 
sales at the start 
of the school 
year without 
buyer credit) 
13 550 554 191 500 521 204 500 523
S2 (individual 
sales at times 
other than the 
start of the 
school year with 
buyer credit) 
690 528 528 158 500 521 848 525 527
S3 (individual 
sales at times 
other than the 
start of the 
school year 
without buyer 
credit) 
31 600 566 395 525 538 426 540 540
Total  1,028 526 528 826 525 530 1,854 525 529
Source: IITA Survey (2006) 
 
The main variables for which data were collected (or constructed using the data collected) 
enable us to characterize the bargaining situation (NEG), the producer’s reserve price (PRP), 
and the buyer’s reserve price (BRP). These variables are summarized in Table 6. We also 
introduced some control variables. These refer to the age and level of education of the 
producers. Gender was not incorporated into the analysis given the very low percentage of 
women in the sample. It is important to note that the expected effect of age is unclear: older 
producers are more experienced but are also often more risk averse.  
 
Table 6: The variables used in the model  
Variables Description of the variable Unit Category Expected 
effect 
Pp
 
Price received by the producer CFA 
francs/ kg 
Dependent 
variable 
 
S3 Bargaining situation during periods other than 
the start of the school year in which the producer 
has not received a supplier credit  
Binary NEG + 
S2 Bargaining situation during periods other than 
the start of the school year in which the producer 
has received a supplier credit  
Binary NEG + 
S1 Bargaining situation at the start of the school Binary NEG + 
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year in which the producer has not received a 
supplier credit  
S0 Bargaining situation at the start of the school 
year in which the producer has received a 
supplier credit  
Binary NEG 0 (reference 
situation) 
RevProd Producer’s total income 10,000 
CFA 
francs/ 
year 
PRP + 
IndDivers Index of the producer’s income diversification 
(the smaller the index, the more the producer is 
diversified)  
between 0 
and 1  
PRP + 
DistProd Distance from the house to the point of sale km PRP + 
NbTransac Number of transactions per producer during the 
campaign 
 PRP + 
Refact Discount for excessive humidity of cocoa  Converted 
into CFA 
francs/ kg 
PRP indeterminate 
InfoP Information about the CIF price (international 
market price) a 
=1 if 
producer 
informed 
PRP + 
PCaf Delayed CIF price (previous fortnight) CFA 
francs/ kg 
BRP + 
DistBuyer Number of km between the point of sale and the 
port of Douala 
km BRP - 
DistBuyer2_ Number of non-tarmac km between the point of 
sale and the port of Douala 
km BRP - 
TypeBuyer Type of buyer: approved buyer or coxeur 1= if app. 
buyer 
BRP + 
QTransac Quantity per transaction kg PRP; BRP + 
HarvestSeason Season of abundance 1= if yes PRP; BRP indeterminate 
QTot Producer’s production kg PRP; BRP + 
NbBuyers Number of approved buyers in the village   PRP; BRP + 
Age Farmer age  PRP indeterminate 
Educ Famer education level 1=if 
farmer has 
been in 
school 
PRP + 
Zone Production region  1= if 
Centre 
PO effect + 
a CIF = cost, insurance and freight 
 
5. Protocol for testing the hypotheses  
Our hypotheses can be tested by regressing the price received by the producer (PP) on the 
variables shown in Table 6. (Descriptive statistics of these variables are in Tables A1 and A2 
in the Appendix.)  
According to hypothesis H1, for transactions carried out at the start of the school year by a 
producer who has received a credit from the buyer, the price should be set at the level of the 
producer’s reserve price (the entire surplus generated by the trade being seized by the buyer). 
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This implies that all variables linked exclusively to the buyer’s reserve price should have no 
effect on the price. Conversely, at least some of the variables linked to the producer’s reserve 
price should have a significant (positive) effect on the price received by the producers. This 
can be tested by taking the sample of the 376 transactions corresponding to bargaining 
situation S0 (Table 5) and by performing the following regression (Table 7): 
 






EducAgeZonenbBuyersQTotsonHarvestSea
QtransacTypeBuyerDistBuyerDistBuyerPCafInfoP
factNbTransacodDistIndDiversodvPP
171615141312
11109876
543210
2
RePrPrRe
 (1) 
 
We consider that H1 is confirmed if β7, β8, β9, and β10 are not significantly different from zero 
and if the coefficients β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, and β6 are all positive or zero, with at least one of them 
being strictly positive. 
Hypothesis H2 stipulates that, in the case of individual sales, the price received by the 
producers should be higher in bargaining situation S1 or S2 than in situation S0 and that it 
should even be higher in situation S3. The theory does not, however, allow a distinction to be 
made between situations S1 and S2. We therefore decided to place situations S1 and S2 in a 
single category called S12. To test hypothesis H2, we take the sample of transactions 
corresponding to all individual sales for both provinces and the four bargaining situations 
(Table 5) and perform the following regression:15 
 






EducAgeSSZonenbBuyersQTotsonHarvestSea
QtransacTypeBuyerDistBuyerDistBuyerPCafInfoP
factNbTransacodDistIndDiversodvPP
1918171615141312
11109876
543210
312
2
RePrPrRe
 (2) 
We consider that H2 is confirmed if β17 > β16 > 0. 
                                                 
15 Variables S1, S2, and S3 are indeed exogenous: the producers are subjected to the bargaining situation rather 
than selecting it. Indeed, they do not choose to sell at the start of the school year or to receive a credit from the 
buyer: they do so because they have no alternative.  
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Table 7: Result of regression (1): test for hypothesis H1  
Independent variable Price 
RevProd 0.071 (1.04) 
IndDivers -4.039 (0.32) 
DistProd 0.193 (2.19)** 
NbTransac 5.939 (3.64)*** 
Refact 0.398 (2.04)** 
QTransac 0.000 (0.04) 
NbBuyer 7.401 (3.09)*** 
QTot 0.000 (0.03) 
InfoP 2.592 (0.43) 
DistBuyer -0.117 (1.32) 
DistBuyer2 -0.164 (1.40) 
PCaf -0.182 (1.63) 
TypeBuyer -0.550 (0.08) 
Age -0.221 (0.99) 
Educ 0.597 (0.05) 
Zone 12.621 (0.76) 
Constant 668.798 (7.13)*** 
Observations 376 
R-squared 0.26 
Robust t-statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Table 8: Result of regression (2): test for hypothesis H2  
Independent variable Price 
S3 21.270 (4.07)*** 
S1.2 6.181 (1.60) 
RevProd 0.095 (2.93)*** 
IndDivers 8.149 (1.67)* 
DistProd 0.108 (1.65)* 
NbTransac 2.730 (3.56)*** 
Refact 0.047 (0.58) 
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QTransac -0.001 (1.52) 
NbBuyer 4.857 (6.22)*** 
HarvestSeason 5.442 (1.60) 
QTot 0.001 (3.13)*** 
InfoP -4.648 (1.60) 
DistBuyer -0.192 (4.11)*** 
DistBuyer2 -0.125 (2.12)** 
PCaf -0.046 (1.02) 
TypeBuyer 10.490 (3.01)*** 
Age -0.395 (3.91)*** 
Educ 0.152 (0.03) 
Zone 15.967 (1.80)* 
Constant 589.575 (15.14)*** 
Observations 1854 
R-squared 0.19 
Robust t-statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
6. Results and discussion 
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Using the ‘robust’ option of the 
Stata software, the t-Student statistics are corrected for the heteroskedasticity of the residuals, 
using White’s method. Robustness is tested. The coefficient R2 is relatively low, which is not 
surprising given the type of data used (a cross-section of primary data). With regard to the 
effect of the bargaining status on the price received by the producers (hypotheses H1 and H2), 
the results are as follows.  
Hypothesis H1 is confirmed by the analyses of the 376 transactions corresponding to situation 
S0 (transactions undertaken at the start of the school year by a producer who has received a 
credit from the buyer). None of the coefficients (β7, β8, β9, and β10) of the four proxies 
representing the buyer’s reserve price (PCaf, DistBuyer, DistBuyer2 and TypeBuyer) has a 
significant effect on the price (see Table 8). However, three of the six proxies for the 
producer’s reserve price are significantly positive (β3, β4, and β5).  
Hypothesis H2 is only partly confirmed by the analysis. The regression performed on the 
1,854 transactions corresponding to individual sales shows that the most favorable bargaining 
situation (S3) does indeed have a beneficial effect on the price received by the producers (β17 
is significantly positive). However, the intermediary bargaining situations (S1 and S2) do not 
enable the producers to obtain a higher price than the reference situation (S0).  
These results confirm the role of the bargaining situation with regard to the price received by 
the producers. If the price is non-negotiable and the price-maker (buyer) is well informed 
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about the producer’s reserve price, the price is set at the level of the producer’s reserve price 
(the buyer seizes the entire surplus generated by the trade). This theoretical result (hypothesis 
H1) is confirmed by the empirical analysis. When moving from this situation which is 
unfavorable to the producer to a more favorable situation (i.e. if the price becomes negotiable 
or if the buyer is no longer informed about the producer’s reserve price), the situation does 
not really improve at the intermediate level (i.e. when the price is non-negotiable and the 
buyer is not informed or when the price is negotiable and the buyer is informed). To obtain a 
significant improvement in the price received by the producer, the distribution of information 
must become more equitable and the price must be made negotiable.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We have shown that the bargaining situation has a significant effect on the prices received by 
cocoa producers in Cameroon. When the bargaining situation is most unfavorable (because 
the interlinked prices are non-negotiable and there is asymmetric information in favor of the 
traders), the traders seize the entire surplus generated by the trade. To improve the price 
received by the producers, the price must be made negotiable while at the same time making 
information less asymmetric. For the cocoa market in Cameroon, this means enabling 
producers to receive more efficient credit (i.e. with the lowest interest rate) and so they can 
refuse the credit provided by cocoa buyers (which binds them to the buyer and makes it 
impossible for them to arbitrate or negotiate the price), so they will be able to wait and sell 
their produce at times other than the start of the school year. 
The main implications for action are as follows. The way to increase the prices received by 
the Cameroonian cocoa producers is to improve their bargaining situation by providing a 
more balanced distribution of information between the producers and the traders, combined 
with negotiable prices. This could be done by promoting an efficient market information 
system. The current system (managed by the ONCC) only provides information about the 
FOB (free on board) price and not about the upcountry prices paid in the domestic market. A 
reduction in information asymmetry could also be achieved by introducing a producer support 
policy at the start of the school year (for example the distribution of vouchers). This would 
enable producers to avoid selling during this period of the year when the traders are aware of 
their financial needs. To improve the price setting rules, it would prove beneficial to introduce 
a credit program (possibly via micro-finance institutions) or a complementary health 
insurance. Backed by this more efficient credit, cocoa producers would be able to negotiate 
the price and capitalize on the competition between buyers.  
Another option would be to promote the development of collective marketing by POs. Further 
research is needed here, but we can assume that this strategy is complementary to the previous 
one based on improving the bargaining power of individual producers. Indeed, the reason for 
producers making limited use of POs to sell their produce (although this would enable them to 
obtain a better price) could be linked to the question of credit. We can assume that producers 
in urgent need of money cannot sell via a PO because they need access to credit (which is 
only available through private buyers) or because they cannot wait until the market day 
organized by the PO to sell their cocoa. A system of credit accessible to the producers (or the 
implementation of credit systems by the POs) could increase the share of supply obtained by 
the POs and at the same time the bargaining power of the producers who sell individually. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the sample of individual transactions undertaken in 
bargaining situation S0 (sample used to test H1) (376 observations) 
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max. 
Price 523.07 60.64 350 700 
RevProd 69.98 49.53 7.5 235 
IndDivers 0.6476781 0.26 0 1 
DistProd 4.87 17.93 0 182 
NbTransac 4.09 2.04 1 12 
Refact 17.31 14.57 0 66.66 
QTransac 711.72 2212.07 5 34000 
NbBuyer 2.25 1.55 1 5 
QTot 2724.48 7025.35 40 102000 
InfoP 0.32 0.467 0 1 
DistBuyer 262.65 72.08 115 378 
DistBuyer2 79.33 69.28 0 223 
PCaf 807.65 25.70 780.38 842.32 
TypeBuyer 0.46 0.48 0 1 
Age 47.53 14.20 18 110 
Educ 0.89 0.30 0 1 
Zone 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 
 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the sample of individual transactions undertaken in 
the Centre region (1,854 observations) 
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max. 
Price 528.50 62.77 300 700 
S3 0.23 0.42 0 1 
S1.2 0.57 0.50 0 1 
RevProd 62.72 46.51 7.5 300 
IndDivers 0.63 0.28 0 2.08 
DistProd 2.77 11.61 0 182 
NbTransac 3.77 2.03 1 12 
Refact 16.97 16.52 0 86.75 
AfJARE  Vol  6  No 1 December  2010                            Cyrille Bergaly Kamdem, Franck Galtier, James Gockowski,  
                                                                                            Hélène  David-Benz, Johny Egg and Bernadette Kamgnia Dia   
 
 
339 
 
QTransac 5.37 1.14 1.61 11.13 
NbBuyer 2.70 2.17 1 10 
HarvestSeason 0.52 0.50 0 1 
QTot 6.79 1.27 3.69 11.53 
InfoP 0.35 0.48 0 1 
DistBuyer 286.32 79.86 115 450 
DistBuyer2 62.48 65.26 0 223 
PCaf 806.65 29.50 766.09 950.81 
TypeBuyer 0.37 0.47 0 1 
Age 48.53 14.75 16 110 
Educ 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Zone 0.45 0.50 0 1 
 
 
 
